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Cascading corruption news: explaining the  
bias of media attention to Brazil’s political scandals 
 
 
Mads Damgaard  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since 2014, a mudslide of corruption allegations and scandals has caught the 
attention of Brazilian media with the corruption probe code-named Lava Jato (Operation 
Car Wash), but remarkably few politicians suffered the consequences of being involved in 
corruption in the state company Petrobras. In the first half of 2016, the mainstream media 
disregarded many elements of the ongoing scandal, choosing instead to cover the 
impeachment proceedings against President Dilma Rousseff intensely. Rousseff and the 
other leader of the Workers’ Party (PT), her mentor Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, were both 
under public scrutiny for commanding the corruption scheme in the state oil company 
Petrobras, and other government coalition parties, most notably the PMDB and PP, were 
also investigated in the Lava Jato case. However, the investigations that documented the 
coalition partner parties’ graft and bribe-taking gradually vanished from the limelight of 
the media while the impeachment process gained momentum; paradoxically in the very 
same period that these parties prepared to grab the reins of the Presidency.  
Why was news on the corruption of these political actors so underexposed in the 
mainstream Brazilian media, and how could the media fail to hold the politicians coming 
into power accountable? Answering these questions exposes information processes in the 
mediatized public sphere of Brazil that are detrimental to both democracy and the combat 
against corruption. 
This article explores the coverage of corruption and impeachment in the 
mainstream media of Brazil, through a content analysis of Folha de S. Paulo, O Estado de 
S. Paulo, and O Globo in the sample period of the six months leading up to the 
impeachment of Dilma Rousseff. In this period, more than a hundred different political 
corruption cases were the topic of news items, but only a select few received sustained 
coverage. Based on the findings of this content analysis of the national newspapers, I study 
the recycling of particular signals of political transgression and corruption as a kind of 
information cascade. Finally, I discuss how these signals, amplified by the media’s 
overexposure and simultaneous disregard for other corruption cases, could be interpreted 
as a deliberate intra-elite strategy (Peruzzotti, 2006; Balán, 2011) aiming to eclipse 
questions of political accountability.  
Information cascades may tempt individuals—voters as well as decisionmakers— 
to make their choices based on the public sequence of information rather than the quality 
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of this information. Such sequences might influence the choices of an electorate or a group 
of decision-makers a great deal. Snowballing media phenomena similar to cascades have 
been theorized from various perspectives and under various names: scandals, media 
storms, moral panics, and media hypes are separate concepts scattered in media studies, 
although they have a lot in common (Boydstun, 2013; Thompson, 2000; Tumber and 
Waisbord, 2004; Welch, Price and Ynakey, 2002; Wien and Elmelund-Præstekær, 2009). 
These disparate concepts all have theoretical affinities with the general media theory called 
agenda-setting (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; McCombs, 2009), but conceptualizing such 
media phenomena in a broader social context has only recently been attempted through 
the notion of information cascades (Hansen, Hendricks and Rendsvig, 2013; Hendricks and 
Hansen, 2014).  
The consequences of a cascade of information can explain bias of overall media 
attention, such as the anti-government bias documented in Brazilian media (Feres Júnior 
and Sassara 2016a, 2016b; Lima, 2006), but investigating cascades goes beyond that: by 
using this conceptualization, rather than ad hoc theories defined by characteristics specific 
to certain media topics, media theory gains a valuable tool in grasping the general social 
mechanisms involved in the chain reactions of media, public actors, and public opinion. 
These dynamic mechanisms might drive public opinion and policymaker attention 
(Boydstun, 2013), but also create pluralistic ignorance of the true state of events (Wiewiura 
and Hendricks, 2017).  
 
The concept of cascades 
 
Informational cascades form the basis of what has been termed infostorms. 
Hendricks and Hansen (2014 following Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1998) point 
out how informational cascades might be harmful to democratic societies, when decision-
making is based on social proof gleaned from publicly available signals rather than verified 
knowledge. The social proof of massive media coverage, polls, and street protests, 
however, does not amount to true information about the state of politics.  
Conceptually, informational cascades consist in rationally acting actors, 
sequentially passing along information through their public actions. The actors cannot 
derive private knowledge possessed by other actors, but nonetheless, all observing actors 
take the actions to be significant down the sequence stream. When making their respective 
choices, these actors might then base their actions on false assumptions about the private 
knowledge of others, adding to the weight of the social proof. Cascades emerge when all 
actors make the same assumptions, reproduce the action, and pass on the same signal—
even when the signal might be untrue. This mechanism might occur both in physically co-
present publics, in online publics, or even between collective actors such as media 
organizations. 
In this article, the cascade mechanism emerging from the media’s coverage of the 
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Lava Jato scandal is under scrutiny. In the context of media, the mechanism consists in 
disclosed information about corruption, reaching the public via news agencies, front pages, 
political news media, or news broadcasts. When various media outlets repeat the same 
signal over and over, an information cascade might form. The cascade is anchored in the 
practical task of the individual journalist, who, in order “to flesh out any one supposed fact 
(…) amasses a host of supposed facts that, when taken together, present themselves as 
both individually and collectively self-validating” (Tuchman, 1978, p. 86). Thus, in the 
everyday practice of making sense of events and transforming them into news, journalists 
reproduce a certain truth regime (Foucault, 1980). A hegemonic interpretation of national 
politics, for example, could be reproduced over and over again by journalists, because this 
will present the shortest route to validate and interpret new information culled from 
sources. Shoemaker and Vos (2009, p. 52) observed that editors and other gatekeepers 
of news will also be prone to groupthink and generally assess the importance of news in 
the same way across the board of a media system. The self-validation is repeated at the 
institutional level, where 
[m]edia institutional actors rely extensively on each other not only as sources 
of reference but also as sources of institutionalized legitimacy, even though 
they lack first-hand access to the event. This reflects the general tendency in 
contemporary journalism of including the perspectives of media institutions, 
commentators, correspondents and other media professionals in the news 
coverage as opposed to involving sources outside the media institutional 
realm (Kristensen and Mortensen, 2015, p. 360). 
Thus, when media professionals and media outlets rely on other outlets and 
professionals for information, news priorities, and mutually legitimating truth regimes, a 
feedback-loop emerges that reproduces the same signal many times over. This might then 
build up into a cascade. The cascade only triggers when there is “a preponderance of 
evidence [that] supports one action or the other by just enough to outweigh one 
individual’s private signal” (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1998). Once an actor 
decides to act upon that information, this constitutes another piece of evidence for others 
to see, as his or her action is also a signal. A cascade of signals might build up into a 
political scandal between journalists, editors, and newsrooms mimicking each other 
through pack journalism, producing explosive amounts of coverage (Boydstun, 2013, p. 
47; Walgrave and Vliegenthart, 2010), as described above. This is then repeated in 
communication amongst audience members: in corruption scandals, when more and more 
people start to call for the resignation of a given politician, that call seems to be justified 
for an increasing number of people, and joining the bandwagon, this call for action 
reinforces itself, resulting in a feedback-loop (Hendricks and Hansen, 2014, p. 91ff). 
To empirically detect an information cascade, the research design needs to account 
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for the signals of the media in some form of content analysis1. Content analysis is also 
traditionally used for agenda-setting research designs. Agenda-setting theory originally 
identified the relation between media coverage and the media audiences’ perception of 
salience of issues (McCombs, 2009), and it is theoretically possible to predict the 
immediate result of a cascade between media actors using agenda-setting theory: An 
information cascade in the media would likely produce an agenda-setting effect, and an 
agenda-setting research design could thus be used to analyze the skewed salience transfer 
effect of a information cascade in media – potentially in the form of explosive surges of 
coverage, common to scandals. The Lava Jato scandal’s salience transfer effects has 
already been studied from this angle: Baptista has demonstrated that during the Lava Jato 
scandal, the approval ratings of the Rousseff administration and trust in federal 
government were significantly correlated to the media coverage of scandals (Baptista, 
2017). As predicted by agenda-setting theory, the extensive coverage made problems of 
governmental corruption very salient to a Brazilian audience already tuned in to the anti-
corruption agenda.  
The agenda-setting effect of a cascade is not surprising; neither is it surprising that 
the media emphasized the impeachment proceedings in their coverage of the political 
crisis. It is urgent to ask, however, what caused or motivated the lack of attention to other 
corruption cases, especially those that implicated political parties and decision-makers 
coming into power. In other words, how did the crisis lead to Rousseff’s downfall, rather 
than that of all the government parties? The well-known salience transfer effect of scandals 
(which translates into lower political support and regime legitimacy, e.g. Maier, 2011; 
Seligson, 2002) is not as interesting as the de-selection of information that gradually 
emerged along with the cascade: how could the very active media disregard some parts of 
the Lava Jato scandal while reproducing the signal of crisis and calling for the ousting of 
the President Rousseff, only to put a corrupt Vice President in her place? Before tackling 
this question, I will present the research design and sampling strategy. 
 
Operationalization and sampling strategy 
 
In the following, I undertake a content analysis of the news items that deal with 
corruption. The content analysis does not compare the amount of news on corruption to 
news dealing with other topics, but examines the distribution of news items reporting or 
commenting on the plethora of corruption cases in the Brazilian political system. The goal 
                                                          
1 Other researchers have addressed similar phenomena with the same approach: Boydstun (2013, p. 82) 
(constructing a study around the term “media storm” and patterns of media attention) sampled news items 
of front pages and coded the news items for issues. Russell and Waisbord (2017), analyzing so-called “news 
flashpoints”, or bursts of coverage, likewise analyzed frequencies of news items (but only items related to 
the Snowden leaks). Both studies dealt with the New York Times, and both worked with a content analysis 
methodology (Russell and Waisbord, 2017, p. 860). Brazilian researchers such as Feres Júnior and Sassara 
(2016b) and Baptista (2017) have also recently used variations of content analysis in comparable research 
designs.   
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is, first, to map out the dynamic evolution of media attention devoted to national political 
scandals. Second, this content analysis might detect feedback patterns in the coverage of 
particular cases, where coverage heaps up, drawing away resources and attention to other 
cases.  
Earlier studies of Brazilian media scandals have examined the prestigious 
newspapers that feed information to a range of associated media outlets (e.g. Feres Júnior 
and Sassara, 2016a; Biroli and Mantovani, 2014; Miguel and Coutinho, 2007). The Brazilian 
media system is concentrated into a few conglomerates (Biroli and Miguel, 2013; Cabral, 
2015; Matos, 2012), and despite new entrepreneur journalists and grass-roots news 
platforms (such as MidiaNINJA, JornalGGN, Tijolaço, and O Antagonista), there is a high 
level of vertical integration in the production on national political news: To a large degree, 
the regional and metropolitan newspapers and broadcasts get their national political news 
mainly from the newsrooms and agencies of three conglomerates—either the two São 
Paulo-based newspapers Folha de S. Paulo and O Estado de S. Paulo, or the network of 
Globo news media (the newspaper O Globo, the newscasts Jornal Nacional and GloboNews, 
the website G1, and the weekly magazine Época). Abramo found that the news recycling 
is determined by the media organization structure:  
Not only the penetration of [Rio- and São Paulo-based] newspapers is much 
higher than the press from other regions, but they also tend to dominate what 
the other newspapers publish. Upon analyzing the credited sources of stories 
published by the newspapers (about 14% of stories are credited to news 
agencies), it is found that the news agencies associated with two newspapers 
(Folha and Estado) are responsible for 90% of all agency-credited news 
published by the newspapers (…) Adding the Globo agency, the percentage is 
95%. This does not count news items that are simply appropriated by a 
newspaper without credit, a very common phenomenon (Abramo, 2007, p. 
99). 
Therefore, in order to detect the frequency of coverage of different corruption cases 
and the impeachment process, three central media outlets are sampled here as a proxy 
for the entire mediascape2. Although the printed versions of Brazilian newspapers do not 
reach large shares of the population, relative to other countries (Albuquerque, 2011, p. 
78; Lattman-Weltman and Chagas, 2016, p. 337), their newsrooms are usually first to 
report on disclosure of corruption, and they are thus the first potential instances in an 
information cascade. News from Folha, Estado, and O Globo filter down to newscasts, radio, 
                                                          
2 As noted by Biroli and Miguel, researchers should be wary of two assumptions here, namely that a) the 
mainstream media conglomerates are completely centralized, unidirectional in their coverage and hegemonic 
in Brazilian news discourse, and b) that the electorate and the public opinion are tied strictly to that 
hegemonic discourse (Biroli and Miguel, 2013, p. 79). However, for the purpose of detecting informational 
cascades amongst audiences, the largest media outlets and their discourses are undeniably the logical place 
to start, all the while bearing in mind that production of news and consumption of news are two decoupled 
stages of meaning production, two separate, but determinate moments (Hall, 1980). 
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and the regional and metropolitan press. Folha’s and Globo’s sites are furthermore the 
most visited Brazilian news sites, miles ahead of the entrepreneur political news blogs and 
online news platforms mentioned above (Newman et al., 2017, p. 107). 
In the sampling, I leave out broadcast and weeklies, not because they do not 
matter, but because their particular formats filter the coverage of political matters much 
tighter than do the newspaper format. TV newscasts, for instance, are limited to specific 
time slots, and will balance political news with other topics, thus giving incomplete pictures 
of national politics on days where other issues congest the media agenda—sports, 
international terrorism, natural disasters, etc. 
In sum, in order to assess how informational cascades propagate throughout a 
totality of media texts, I sample all front pages from Folha, Estado, and O Globo—the three 
main national papers of Brazil—and, furthermore, sample all printed and web-published 
articles in Folha and Estado dealing with news on national corruption and the impeachment 
proceedings (this leaves out stories on corruption abroad, e.g. the Panama Papers, as well 
as corruption in the international soccer association FIFA). The sample period contains the 
six months of front-page items up until the Lower House of Congress voted on the 
impeachment (on April 17, 2016), while the article sample comprised the period October 
2015 to May 12, 2016, when the Senate ratified the vote of the Lower House. The total 
sample includes 8,800 news items, and more than 1,300 front page items, all dealing with 
news on political transgression and corruption.  
Content analysis of front-page material provides an index of how salient each issue 
or story was on the national media agenda because the front pages of the three national 
newspapers signal importance and drive the Brazilian media agenda in general, as 
discussed above. The article count, meanwhile, provides an index of how attention to all 
cases of corruption was allocated, including the cases that did not make it to the front 
pages. The content analysis of articles samples news items and political commentary (but 
not editorials) in Estado and Folha, leaving out O Globo in order to avoid excess data 
redundancy3. Both data sets reflect the distribution of media attention and the editorial 
and journalistic selection processes, which are instrumental in setting up an information 
cascade in public spheres. 
 
Framing and coding 
 
As shown by Iyengar (1990), the framing of news influences audience members’ 
assignment of responsibility. Therefore, the articles and the headlines were coded by 
associating each news item with the object of the investigation, that is, the individual or 
party framed as responsible. Not surprisingly, most articles and headlines about corruption 
                                                          
3 After an initial sampling period where 500 news items were collected from Folha, O Globo and Estado, the 
corpus was determined to be more than sufficiently saturated (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), and O Globo was 
left out of the article count in the rest of the sampling period to reduce redundancy. 
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point to the transgressions of specific politicians, while a group of news items deals with 
the Petrobras corruption probe en bloc without explicitly attributing responsibility to a 
specific actor. Some news items mention multiple cases, but this was deliberately reduced 
in the coding process in order to avoid a qualitative weighting of each news item in the 
corpus (which would render the large sample unwieldy). Thus, despite overlaps in a fraction 
of the sample, the news items were coded as pertaining to only one case each4.  
The coding of items does not go to the level of detail in framing analysis proposed 
by authors such as Entman (1993), nor does it include the many variations of organizing 
discursive principles through which occurrences are constructed and organized as 
meaningful events in news items (Tuchman, 1978, p. 193ff). Although the competing 
framings of the impeachment and the Lava Jato case are highly interesting (see Rizotto, 
Prudencio and Sampaio, 2017; Fontes, Ferracioli and Sampaio, 2016), I will argue that the 
framing of single news items are unlikely to be of interest to research. Normally, frame 
analysis aims at detecting whether and how audiences are swayed by exposure to 
alternate, competing frames concerning a political issue. However, such a 
conceptualization of audiences assumes that audience members have not already formed 
strong opinions about the issue, and the assumption is really researchers’ artificial 
sequestering of the audience (Sniderman and Theriault, 2004, p. 141).  
Competing frames were clearly present in the public debate; e.g. frames claiming 
a coup d’état versus a constitutionally legitimate impeachment, or frames projecting a 
strong Judiciary as protagonists competing with frames where the Lava Jato prosecutors 
and judges were cast as ideologically driven and vindictive crusaders or justiceiros. Given 
the extreme exposure of the case, it is very likely that audiences have met a large range 
of news on various platforms, and this would mean at least some exposure to 
heterogeneous framings. Although it would be possible to study the relative weight of 
frames in the sample texts, as long as “artificial sequestering” of the audience is 
impossible, we cannot gauge the effect of the different frames found in the sample. 
Ultimately, in the case of the Lava Jato probe and the impeachment process, it is highly 
unlikely that any one journalistic framing would produce any effect at all, since the case is 
                                                          
4 Some actors had a range of different scandal cases or political transgressions covered by the media—Lula 
and Rousseff in particular, as well as Renan Calheiros. Because of this, some news items and columns 
mention several cases, but the coding of each item was then defined solely by the case highlighted in the 
headline or the lead, which usually refers to the most recent and actual event (such as a testimony, a leak, 
or investigation process). This means that, in principle, some cases appear more frequently in the material 
than the figures reported here suggest at first glance; the best example of this is the many items covering 
the impeachment that also mention the corruption of Petrobras, although this element was legally outside of 
the impeachment proceedings. The number of news items connecting Rousseff to the corruption in Petrobras 
is therefore even higher than the figures reported here suggest, and the same goes for Cunha, whose trial 
was often mentioned in news items dealing with other political actors. This research design opted for a strict 
coding with one case (or frame) per item in order to avoid having to equilibrate the weight of thousands of 
news articles—a task that would move towards a qualitative analysis rather than a quantitative one and 
would only exacerbate the finding of skew in the media attention to cases. 
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so central to the contemporary public debate of Brazil, and audience members would be 
likely to have formed opinions before encountering specific texts. 
 
Historical context of the infostorm of impeachment 
 
Two historical precedents must be mentioned in order to explain the context of the 
impeachment and the corruption cases embroiling national politics in Brazil. The first 
precedent is the Mensalão case of 2005, which revealed a kickback scheme supporting the 
coalition management of the Lula government. The case attracted sustained media 
attention and was hailed as a milestone in Brazilian accountability and combat against 
corruption, but it also became a fix-point of ongoing negative framings of PT (Biroli and 
Mantovani, 2014; Feres Júnior and Sassara, 2016b; Michener and Pereira, 2016). In the 
decade following this scandal, mainstream media (such as Veja, Globo’s various outlets, 
and Estado) exhibited increasing hostility toward the PT governments (e.g. Albuquerque, 
2013, p. 5-15; Araújo, Costa and Fittipaldi, 2016, p. 105; Miguel and Coutinho, 2007, p. 
103; Porto, 2012, p. 172). The Mensalão case went to trial in the Supreme Court seven 
years after being revealed, its crowning moment being the declaration of the verdicts, 
when a number of PT leaders, bankers, money launderers, and Congressmen from the 
government coalition were sentenced. This was lauded as an exception to the rule of 
impunity prevailing for the political elite in corruption scandals (Damgaard, 2015b; Pereira, 
Rennó and Samuels, 2011).   
President Dilma Rousseff had started her first mandate in 2011 with a tough-on-
corruption stance, firing many ministers involved in scandals (Araujo, Costa e Fittipaldi, 
2016). Perhaps aided by this stance, Rousseff had weathered the storm of the Mensalão 
trial in 2012, albeit not without losing some public support (Avritzer, 2016, p. 44). 
However, six months after the sentencing of the Mensalão trial, a series of street protests 
occurred in the state capitals of Brazil. Initial protests against the price of bus fare in São 
Paulo picked up steam and erupted into national protests during June 2013, with millions 
in the streets—numbers unseen since the 1980s and early 1990s. The protesters were not 
united under any single banner, as the multitude in the streets branched off from the topic 
of public transportation fares (Saad-Filho, 2013). However, the mainstream media 
interpreted the street protests and online representations of these protests as being 
focused on corruption, inadequate public services, and governmental overspending 
(especially on the World Cup prestige construction projects) (Avritzer, 2016, p. 77).  
The topic of corruption kept re-appearing at inconvenient moments for Rousseff’s 
PT-led government. Five months before the presidential campaign kicked off, in March 
2014, a money-laundering scheme was uncovered by police agents in Curitiba. The scheme 
had ties to the very top of the state oil company Petrobras, with one Petrobras director, 
Paulo Roberto Costa, caught red-handed destroying evidence. Costa opted for a plea 
bargain in order to reduce his eventual sentence, revealing a cartel of companies that 
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colluded in tenders to share overpriced subcontracts in exchange for kickbacks to political 
actors. In November 2014, CEOs and presidents of seven of these companies were 
arrested, based on the information provided by a chain of testimonies initiated by Costa.  
The press treated the testimonies of the Petrobras case as evidence that could 
swing the elections, and the scandal, therefore, had a dominating position in the election 
coverage, especially in the weekly press. In a historically close race, Rousseff won the 
second turn over Aécio Neves, but the former immediately faced calls for impeachment 
due to her perceived involvement in the Petrobras case, as former head of the company’s 
Administrative Board. The losing candidate’s party, PSDB, filed a number of petitions 
proposing to annul the elections, also based on exposés of the Petrobras case. After her 
re-election, the opposition lacked “the smoking gun” pointing to the President’s 
involvement in the disclosed corruption at Petrobras, but several leaks from the 
investigations cast suspicions of corruption upon Rousseff’s party, the PT.  
Following the inauguration of Rousseff in January, the PT lost control of the 
important position of President of the Lower House of Congress. The evangelical leader 
Eduardo Cunha of PMDB assumed this position, and he soon became the target of leaks 
alleging his involvement in the Petrobras graft. As the year 2015 progressed, more 
investigations followed, and evidence and testimonies were continuously made public by 
the task-force of the Lava Jato case and the federal courts handling the case. This 
information was put to good use by journalists in the mainstream media—to a large extent, 
as shown in the following section, homing in on the President’s party, although all of the 
most important parties from opposition and government alike seemed to have had stakes 
in the kickback scheme. 
 
Findings 
 
In the six-month period of the sample, 1176 front page items of the three major 
Brazilian newspapers were identified, all dealing with the corruption of the main political 
actors, the Petrobras scandal, or the impeachment. In the same period, 150 other items 
dealt with corruption allegations or probes against other actors (governors, senators, and 
mayors foremost among these) as well as six headlines alleging corruption of the then Vice 
President, Michel Temer. The company most frequently denounced for corruption in the 
headlines was Odebrecht, but this was nowhere near as frequent as news items on the 
corruption of politicians (despite being logically connected). 
At the beginning of the sample period, in October 2015, the front pages and articles 
treated a diverse range of corruption subjects: Lula, Eduardo Cunha, the parliamentary 
investigation of Petrobras, as well as the fiscal delays that made the Congressional audit 
body TCU reject the accounts of the state. However, the diversity was gradually reduced, 
as the attention of the sampled media outlets gravitated towards a few select cases. 
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Graphic 1 
Frequency of news items on corruption cases on the front pages of Folha, 
Estado, and O Globo, October 2015 till April 2016 
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 Source: Author’s database of front pages. 
 
As discussed in the theoretical section of this article, the information flows leading 
to cascades must be understood as dynamic phenomena. This means that when signals 
are amplified, other signals may be attenuated and eventually lost in the din, as this graph 
of the most covered corruption cases demonstrates: The attention to Lula and Cunha 
continued into November, with a spike of attention as the PT senator Delcídio de Amaral 
was arrested in the Lava Jato probe, followed by peaks of media interest in the first half of 
December, when Cunha signaled the start of the impeachment process. The various signals 
about corruption surging in October and November were drowned out in early 2016 as the 
newspapers dedicated their attention to cases related to Lula. The zika virus scare attracted 
attention in February, which meant that the front pages had a brief lull of attention to 
corruption. The graph demonstrates that on March 4, 2016, the moment that Lula was 
taken to testify in São Paulo airport, following the arrest of PT’s marketing expert, the 
intensity of media attention to corruption increased and, shortly thereafter, decisively 
shifted its focus towards the question of impeachment. 
The pivotal point of this graph is the days following the leak of recorded 
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conversations with Lula, on March 16, where Lula’s cases (yellow bars) began to be 
overtaken by headlines dealing with the impeachment (in blue bars). From that point on, 
impeachment news gathered speed and grew tremendously, dwarfing and eventually in 
April completely suppressing other news about politics or the corruption of the political 
actors assuming the mantle of the Presidency.   
By comparing the relative frequency of headlines and news items about 
impeachment and corruption in the President’s party, PT, to the coverage on other 
investigated politicians, it is clear that the mainstream media to a large degree reproduced 
and amplified the framing of the political game set in motion by the political actors rooting 
for impeachment. In the table below, the frequency of front-page items for each of the 
main actors’ corruption cases is summed for the sample period. Outside of the PT, the most 
frequent corruption cases in the headlines dealt with Congress Presidents Cunha and 
Calheiros (both belonging to the PMDB), opposition leader and presidential runner-up in 
2014 Aécio Neves, and the main subcontractor Odebrecht (from the cartel organizing the 
kickback scheme). The issues of impeachment and fiscal delays (the so-called pedaladas, 
described below) are separated from the news items concerning Dilma Rousseff’s alleged 
corruption: 
 
Table 1 
 Summed frequency of front-page news items concerning corruption cases in 
Folha, Estado, and O Globo, October 2015 till April 2016 
 
Impeachment Dilma Pedaladas Lula Petrobras Cunha Odebrecht Delcídio Calheiros Neves 
327 61 33 261 206 160 48 43 22 15 
Source: Author’s database of front pages. 
 
Only Eduardo Cunha had visibility in the headlines close to the President’s, though 
he escaped the limelight while gradually steering the impeachment proceedings in the 
Congress. While news attention to Cunha remained mostly steady during the period (a 
total of 160 headlines distributed across the six months), news about Lula (total 261) and 
then about the Petrobras investigations (206 headlines total) eventually eclipsed news 
about Cunha’s corruption cases, starting at the turn of the year. 
Turning to the findings of the second data set, the sample of articles in Estado and 
Folha, we see the same pattern. Despite a range of involved actors, impeachment and 
corruption in the PT dominated news in the period. Most notably among these were Dilma 
Rousseff’s mentor, ex-president Lula (950 news items in total), and the government 
spokesman senator Delcídio do Amaral (280 total). 
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Graphic 2 
 Frequency of news items in Folha and Estado (web and print total) for key 
actors related to corruption and impeachment 
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 Source: Author’s database of news items on corruption and impeachment. 
 
The only story to rival those about the PT was the composite news narrative 
consisting in 600 items dealing with Eduardo Cunha. News on corruption in Petrobras in 
general, most frequently mentioning PT and/or PMDB with no specific politicians 
associated, reached 595 during the sample period. Items concerning Dilma Rousseff’s 
involvement in the Petrobras graft and laundered money from the Petrobras scheme 
feeding her 2014 campaign reached more than 290 items in total, while impeachment news 
items numbered more than ten times that figure (3369) in the two news outlets.  
This intense focus on these four persons dwarfs by a considerable margin the rest 
of the investigated politicians in the political elite. At the top of the second tier, Renan 
Calheiros was the focus of over 60 news items, just ahead of Aécio Neves. While Neves 
was only subjected to an investigation later in the Petrobras probe, Calheiros accumulated 
investigations in 12 cases of corruption. Other key politicians investigated for corruption 
(senators Raupp and Jucá of PMDB, and Anastasia of PSDB, for instance) did not appear 
half as often as Renan and Aécio in the news. Like the once-impeached President, now 
senator, Fernando Collor de Mello of PTB, these third-tier politicians were the objects of 
less than a total of 20 news items each across the two news outlets.  
In comparison, the sons of the ex-president Lula (Luís Cláudio and Fábio Luís) had 
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more (negative) traction with media, despite never running for public office: Allegations 
and investigations targeting the ex-president’s sons were the topic of 73 and 36 articles in 
the corpus, respectively. In relative terms, attention to the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff 
is greater than all news topics concerning corruption. The ratio between the attention paid 
to the four most prominent scandals (Dilma, Lula, Cunha, and Delcidio) is thus 9:3:2:1. 
While the ratio between news on Dilma’s and Aécio Neves’ scandals was 50:1, the ratio 
between news on Lula and Neves was 19:1, and Cunha relative to Neves 12:1. The 
senators Romero Jucá and Valdir Raupp were almost lost, 500:1 in relation to impeachment 
news, and about 250:1 in relation to news on Lula.  
The former Vice President Michel Temer, who in May 2016 ascended to the 
Presidency, rarely made the headlines for his relations to corruption cases during 2015 and 
2016, though many testimonies in the corruption probe mentioned him. The same was 
true of the rest of the PMDB politicians, again despite being mentioned in testimonies for 
benefitting from the Petrobras graft. Media attention only shifted towards them as they 
took cabinet positions with Temer’s ascendancy. That attention had effects, however: 
within 34 days of Temer seizing power, three ministers had stepped down. Most 
prominently, the minister of Planning and Budgets, Romero Jucá, had to take his leave 
after twelve days as minister, because recordings where leaked in which he discussed how 
to stop the corruption probe from reaching himself and his allies. The very same Jucá, 
however, maintained his seat in the Senate, and participated in the Senate’s verdict against 
Rousseff. At the top of the second tier, Renan Calheiros was the focus of over 60 news 
items, just ahead of Aécio Neves. 
 
Information value in scandals  
 
Having shown that a bias in the distribution of attention to the range of political 
corruption scandals was evident in the mainstream media, it is pertinent to ask: What 
reason might the media outlets have for such a biased coverage? Why was information on 
impeachment and PT corruption valued so highly by media actors, and how could the 
bubble of information developing around the impeachment proceedings grow so huge? The 
mechanism of information cascades is one piece of a puzzle to which I now add the concept 
of informational value. By doing so, the analysis of the specific information cascade 
structure is supplemented by the theoretical question of how information in such cascades 
emerges as important and valuable for media actors. In the following, I will consider 
disclosed information in corruption scandals as assets, that is, elements which hold value 
to media actors and political actors alike. Based on observations of the contemporary 
Brazilian media system (Albuquerque, 2011; Lattman-Weltman and Chagas, 2016), I also 
discuss how this information value is modified by systemic and commercial factors.  
Scandalous revelations and media exposés contain information that can potentially 
be part of horizontal accountability processes such as impeachment, court trials, or judicial 
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actions in electoral courts. Corruption scandals also involve the dimension of vertical, 
electoral accountability (Mainwaring, 2003) to the extent that voters remember scandals 
and punish involved candidates by denying them votes. However, this dimension is 
notoriously weak in Brazil (Rennó, 2011; Winters and Shapiro-Weitz, 2013), and so 
disclosure of corruption is more likely to have a political effect through horizontal 
accountability. 
The processes of horizontal accountability institutions are not merely legal, but also 
deeply political in nature, and their consequences are furthermore both reflected and 
shaped by the media trajectory of the scandal (Thompson, 2000): sustained coverage 
across all media outlets is in principle more likely to generate consequences than disclosure 
in fits and starts, because the sustained attention is more likely to push institutions and 
civil society into action. When an intra-media cascade of recycled coverage creates such a 
sustained media storm (Walgrave et al., 2017, p. 9), it is theoretically more likely that the 
scandal triggers accountability processes.  
The potential of disclosed information on corruption to wreak political havoc or 
trigger trials in courts or accountability institutions is neither necessarily nor sufficiently 
determined by its belonging to categories of disinformation (which is intentionally false) or 
misinformation (unintentionally false), though the likelihood of falsification certainly might 
influence the value. Even information that can never be verified might have political 
consequences. In fact, information cannot even be defined as ”well-formed, meaningful 
and truthful data” (Floridi, 2011, p. 80) because contextual factors such as imparting 
processes, intentionality and semantic layers have to be taken into account (Fallis, 2011). 
The front page of the weekly magazine Veja in October 2014, “revealing” the PT presidents’ 
knowledge of the Petrobras corruption, is a prime example of this, because private 
knowledge is hardly verifiable, but the pseudo-disclosure of Lula and Rousseff’s knowledge 
ultimately had political, rather than epistemological, intentions. The exposé was based on 
one of many testimonies made by the original money launderer in the Petrobras case, 
although his knowledge of their supposed awareness was in turn based on signals from the 
Petrobras CEO. 
By removing the predicate ”well-formed” from the definition of information in 
Floridi’s ”truthful and meaningful” category, information as a concept is thrust towards the 
notion of framing, discussed above (Entman, 1993; Sniderman and Theriault, 2004). The 
money launderer’s information about Lula and Rousseff was framed as scandalous, 
although lacking in hard evidence. 
Thus, information about political transgression can be framed through journalistic 
and editorial production as highly corrupt, though the political action in question might not 
be verifiable or even criminal in the technical sense. Through certain framing devices, 
information can even be formed and then imparted exactly and truthfully, but partially, in 
a way to create states of potential misinformation with the audiences. A range of leaks in 
the Lava Jato case, stemming from the prosecutors and investigative authorities, has been 
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criticized for creating such states of misinformation, because the leaks were framed as 
truthful by the media, no matter the vested interests of the whistle-blowers and the 
individuals leaking the information (Guimarães et al., 2016). 
The information value of scandal also implies the anticipation of value, and the a 
priori realization of this value. Realizing value a priori means journalistically narrating the 
consequences of, say, a scandal, before those consequences manifest. This was quite 
visible in the coverage of Lula’s alleged ownership of a ranch and a beachfront apartment 
during January and February 2016: Seven months before the Federal Police even indicted 
Lula, on August 27, the possible political consequences were all the rage of the mainstream 
media (as seen in Graphic 1), because the information about these estates and their 
ownership was potentially lethal to Lula’s plan about running for Presidency in 2018. 
Anticipating the value of information is part and parcel of how news media operate during 
scandals, because any information element in a scandal is only as interesting as its 
potential value. The potential value of information is thus tied to perceptions of whether 
allegations will stick, and expectations about whether a scandal will generate effective 
accountability processes.  
In other words, information value derives from what could be termed the disruptive 
potential of that information. The disruptive potential depends on the relevance of disclosed 
information to institutional processes (what can be included, what will count as evidence, 
etc.), and the eventual trajectory of the processes triggered by disclosure (what is the 
ultimate outcome, e.g. how much political damage can the disclosed information inflict). 
Those questions are also relevant in the editorial processes and the social media’s re-
dissemination after publication (what disclosed information merits a follow-up story, what 
will be re-tweeted, liked, and shared, etc.).  
This anticipated potential of information is tied to another aspect of information 
value: information about the perceived center of political agency, such as the Presidency, 
is valued higher than information about more marginal actors. The proximity to perceived 
centers of power goes a long way in determining what information will be transmitted in 
the mainstream medias’ information flow. Albuquerque (2011, p. 91) has observed that 
presidentialism seems to be an important, but under-researched parameter when studying 
media-politics relations. With the concepts of information value and perceived disruptive 
potential, I suggest one (non-exhaustive) explanation for understanding the peculiar 
importance of presidents in this kind of media system: within a presidential system, editors 
and media organizations want to pay special attention to cases that might disrupt the 
president, because such information presents far greater and more exceptional 
consequences than in parliamentary democracies, where government turnover is part of 
the regular institutional set-up. A case of an unstable president demands attention in virtue 
of the institutional exceptionality and will provide raw and juicy material for scandal 
coverage. Such coverage reinforces the notion of the presidency as the locus of political 
agency. Regardless of which other political forces actually dominate, this draws away 
CASCADING CORRUPTION NEWS: EXPLAINING THE BIAS OF MEDIA ATTENTION TO BRAZIL’S POLITICAL SCANDALS 
 
 
 
OPINIÃO PÚBLICA, Campinas, vol. 24, nº 1, jan.-abr., 2018 
129  
attention from party politics and towards the person of the president. 
The predilection for presidential affairs may be a strategy to obscure the real party 
allegiances of the media organizations reporting on politics, but it could also be the result 
of a conscious marketing strategy: as noted above, the prestigious newspapers of Brazil 
have taken critical stances towards PT presidents for a decade, and this re-emergence of 
party/press parallelism (or repartidarização) could be a way of bolstering a brand and 
keeping politically engaged readers interested in the newspaper as a product (Lattman-
Weltman and Chagas, 2016). This trend creates a commercial pressure for a certain kind 
of political news, in the form of exposés that tarnish the PT, given that elite newspapers 
are more likely to sell actual copies to the metropolitan business and political elite which 
traditionally supports center-right ideologies. 
There are more commercial dimensions to scandals: a scandal, to editors, 
represents an attention-grabbing pool of different stories that can be mined continuously 
with a certain amount of recycled information. Therefore, a scandal is a cheap investment 
compared to the amount of stories it can yield (Beale, 2006, p. 401). In terms of audience, 
the newspaper with a scandalous headline is assumed to sell more, meaning more 
advertising revenue. Furthermore, as scandals usually beg the question ”did somebody 
else know this?” it is easy to escalate the scandal to other actors or to the national level, 
meaning a greater potential audience. If advertising is a centerpiece of the newspaper or 
networks business model, then scandals will be especially in demand in situations of 
stagnant or dropping audiences—a situation that applies to roughly all of the traditional 
media after the advent of the Internet. 
In sum, disclosure of scandals holds value both for political actors and in the 
commercial strategies of elite newspapers. Even with a varied palette of scandals, 
information that could disrupt a presidential term would be of special interest to this part 
of the media system. In the analysis of the content study, I have shown that only a few of 
the many corruption cases of national interest were covered extensively by the three 
newspapers and the online news platforms of Folha and Estado because Lula and the 
impeachment drew all the attention. The cascade of news items dealing with these topics 
gradually eclipsed all other news about corruption on the media agenda, and this section 
has considered why these two storylines were all the rage from the perspective of the 
Brazilian media. Given that the political actors of Brazil are aware of these dynamics, this 
begs the question of how disclosed information is used for political gain. In the next section, 
I will analyze how the information cascade could be interpreted as a part of a deliberate 
intra-elite strategy specifically aiming to eclipse questions of political accountability.  
 
Triggering scandals to create cascades and coalition reconfiguration 
 
As argued by Balán (2011), denunciations of corruption provide political actors with 
a tool for changing sides in a political race. Scandals, in the analysis of Balán, are triggered 
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by the competition between government actors for power and resources. Identifying a 
significant pattern of correlation between scandal frequency and high intra-government 
competition in Chilean and Argentinian politics in recent decades, Balán’s model also 
applies to the Brazilian case (as shown by Araújo, Costa and Fittipaldi, 2016): scandals are 
a means to an end—and that end is not cleaner politics, but re-distributing political 
influence and resources5. Balán’s results echoed Peruzzotti, who considered media exposés 
“an instrument of the “politics by other means” that ultimately feed political cynicism and 
apathy” (Peruzzotti, 2006, p. 256), and Waisbord’s analysis of Latin American watchdog 
media: where media provide channels for politics by other means, scandals in reality 
express the vested interests of elites rather than the ideals of watchdog journalism 
(Waisbord, 2000, p. 233). In the Brazilian context, Porto underscored the same problem 
and also called to attention the problem of “[c]ollusion between journalists and officials 
[that] frequently prevents watchdogs from barking even when evidence of wrongdoing is 
available” (Porto, 2011, p. 111). 
In the following, I stipulate that Brazil’s political actors (in Congress as well as in 
courts and accountability institutions) are aware that media scandals can bring about an 
infostorm. Given this, it makes sense to consider the complex interplay of investigations, 
denunciations, leaks and scandal as a cascade of signals that were deliberately emitted to 
create the particular political ambience that lead to the ousting of Dilma Rousseff. The 
point of this is to show how identifiable actors that strategically stoked media interest 
fueled the cascade of corruption information, and how this information transformed from 
rumor and anticipated information (in the sense described above) to hard financial and 
political facts.  
Employing this perspective, the intertwined narratives of the impeachment and the 
Lava Jato scandal may be unpacked in the following manner: A group within the political 
elite of the Brazilian Congress, centered in PMDB, aired the idea of impeaching President 
Rousseff after the 2014 elections, and the idea rapidly caught on in the media. How exactly 
to delimit this group is not possible at this point, but we may surmise 1) that said group 
of politicians believed it to be possible to remove the President through judicial means 
(either in the Supreme Electoral Court or through impeachment); 2) that the group 
eventually deemed it advantageous and even necessary to wrench power from Rousseff 
because winning the presidency could potentially stop corruption probes and investigations 
against themselves; and 3) that several members of the group of politicians held key 
positions in Congress, allowing them to control impeachment proceedings against the 
President. 
By combining the Petrobras denunciations against the President’s party with 
critique of her fiscal policy, a splinter group of PMDB (PT’s main coalition partner) prepared 
                                                          
5 In this case, the outcome of scandals predicted in Araújo, Costa and Fittipaldi (2016) was actually 
inverted: The re-distribution of cabinet positions, initiated by the jump-ship strategy that became viable 
with the Petrobras scandal, benefitted, at the time of writing, the parties most distant ideologically to the 
Executive, because the Executive as a whole was replaced. 
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to jump ship (in the strategical sense of Balán, 2011, p. 462) and declare themselves as 
opposition. The first PMDB politician to make that move was the President of the Lower 
House, Eduardo Cunha, on July 17, 2015. This had, not coincidentally, the effect of 
displacing the media spotlight, because Cunha’s case in the corruption probe had advanced 
the most in the Supreme Court, and the court handling the Lava Jato case had published 
the testimony of a CEO confirming paying bribes to Cunha the day before his break with 
government. Furthermore, Cunha’s move followed the primary hypothesis proposed by 
Balán (2011), because it forced the President to concede more space to PMDB in cabinet, 
in hope of stabilizing and maintaining the government alliance.  
Cunha then began to harass the Rousseff government by signaling the viability of 
the impeachment petitions he had received as President of the Lower House of Congress. 
Through his position, he was vested with the power to deny or proceed with the 
impeachment process, but only actions pertaining to Rousseff’s current mandate could 
constitute a legal ground for impeachment. The fiscal delays called pedaladas fiscais turned 
out to provide a ground for impeachment. During 2014, the Finance Ministry had expanded 
a practice of delaying transfers of funds between the National Treasury and public banks. 
Temporarily shifting the burden of the programs onto other public actors, the delays 
somewhat masked the fact that the state accounts were in bad shape after years of 
plummeting oil prices and the great slow-down of the Chinese economy, the most 
important export market of Brazil. Denounced in Estado as an illegal budget maneuver, 
the government, however, stopped that practice in 2014, but in October 2015, the 
Congressional audit body TCU (Tribunal de Contas da União) rejected the government 
accounts of 2014 because of the delays.  
The TCU auditors argued that the delays and credit maneuvers transgressed the 
Law of Fiscal Responsibility (Villaverde, 2016, p. 179ff, 223), and this fed a new wave of 
impeachment petitions. A trio of lawyers elaborated the argument that other situations (in 
2015) in which the government had obtained credit without prior ratification by Congress 
could be considered criminal, as could other maneuvers shifting the burden of state credit. 
Thus, the negative evaluation of Rousseff’s fiscal policies and management of state 
accounts was chosen as the argument for the eventually successful impeachment petition, 
in the absence of any investigations targeting her specifically in the ongoing corruption 
probe. The President herself was allegedly responsible for the practice, according to the 
petition, and both this claim and the legal grounds became hotly contested. The practice 
of delaying payments is wide-spread at both the federal and state levels in Brazil, and the 
President’s hand in cooking the books through quite specific fiscal transactions was 
debatable.  
Having used the petition for levering support from PT parliamentarians in 
November 2015, Cunha faced his own disciplinary trial in a Congressional committee—a 
trial that would eventually annul his mandate. PT members of the committee voted against 
Cunha, which started a Congressional trial; in retaliation, he opened impeachment 
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proceedings on December 2, 2015. At that moment, 32 different impeachment petitions 
had been produced by various actors. Most of them alluded to the Petrobras graft, as did 
the petition that Cunha allowed to proceed. So, despite the dearth of hard evidence in 2015 
that could topple Rousseff, and despite the clause that restricts impeachment to acts of 
the current term, the Petrobras case still became entangled with impeachment 
proceedings, through the following sequence of public signals:  
 
Sequence of signals in 2015 
 
1. (January onwards) Continued investigations of Petrobras → Media focus on PT and 
Rousseff  
2. (March 8 and March 15) Protests call for the impeachment of Rousseff, eclipsing the 
investigations opened into 47 politicians, the majority belonging to the PP  
3. (June) Cunha is cited as involved in the Petrobras case in a plea bargain → Cunha 
declares himself in opposition to government and, thus, signals “jump ship” to his 
party →  
4. (July-August) Cunha signals that impeachment petitions are being considered 
5. (August-October) Cunha and several other politicians are denounced in the Petrobras 
probe → The opposition signals support for impeachment and starts obstructing 
economic reform bills proposed by the government 
6. (October) TCU rejects the government’s 2014 accounts because of the fiscal delays 
→ the eventually-accepted impeachment petition is handed in to Cunha, arguing for 
impeachment on the grounds of those delays   
7. (December) A disciplinary process against Cunha is initiated in the Ethics Council of 
Congress → Cunha announces that impeachment proceedings will be opened 
 
As parts of PMDB and other center parties of the government coalition followed 
Cunha’s jump-ship strategy, the government lost support for any economic reform that 
could diminish a state budget deficit in 2015. Later, Rousseff’s inability to pass bills then 
became the pretense for these coalition parties for abandoning the PT and supporting the 
Vice President’s bid for power. Three processes unfolded simultaneously: the Lava Jato 
scandal, the looming budget deficit, and the impeachment. The processes tied together 
different bits of information in the political game set afoot by Cunha and the lawyers behind 
the petition, merging together the narrative that the state accounts were in bad shape, 
that Rousseff was responsible, and that her party, through corruption, had bankrupted the 
state oil company Petrobras, once the largest company in all of South America. Studies 
and opinion polls of the time show a correlation between the population’s approval of 
government, the perception of negative news, and the Petrobras scandal (Baptista, 2017; 
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Datafolha, 2016; Indicadores CNI, 2015a, 2015b)6. 
The polls do not necessarily show that the Brazilian audiences confounded the facts 
of the nation’s fiscal situation and the rumors of Rousseff’s involvement in the Petrobras 
corruption, but it is clear from political discourse in the same period that large blocks of 
Congressmen from both opposition and former government coalition partners rallied 
around that narrative constellation. The public signal, sent by Cunha by accepting the 
petition for impeachment, was thus multiplied and disseminated by a growing group within 
the political elite. While these parliamentarians, predominantly from the center and right-
wing parties, added their weight to the beginning cascade, they disregarded the 
accumulation of evidence in the Petrobras investigations against Cunha and PMDB 
leadership. 
 
Sequence of signals in 2016 
 
1. (February) Dilma Rousseff’s marketing strategist is taken into custody in the 
Petrobras case 
2. (February) Investigations into Petrobras corruption target Lula and PTs marketing 
expert →   
3. (March) PMDB breaks from government, signaling “jump ship” to the rest of the 
center parties → the rest of the government coalition partners leaves government  
4. (April) 367 Chamber of Federal Representatives vote for opening impeachment 
proceedings 
 
The suspicion that the group within the political elite of Brazil was interested in 
removing President Rousseff with the intention of saving their own hides was confirmed in 
May. The proof became breaking news soon after the new coalition coalescing in Congress, 
united under the name “O Centrão” and, led by Eduardo Cunha, replaced Rousseff with 
Vice President Michel Temer of the PMDB. That became evident with recent leaked 
recordings published by Folha on May 23, 2016.  
The secret recordings were taped before the impeachment was executed, and 
featured a key witness in the Petrobras case discussing the removal of Rousseff with major 
political actors of the PMDB, such as Renan Calheiros and ex-president José Sarney. In the 
conversations, the politicians agree that it is necessary to end the corruption probes into 
the political establishment, which threatened to “put an end to the political class”. Another 
                                                          
6 Public opinion polls in the period from the 2014 elections to the end of 2015 showed that 32% of the 
respondents noticed negative news coverage around the elections, which increased to 45% in late 2014 and 
then reached 72% in March 2015, an apogee that was maintained for the rest of the year. During the same 
period, President Rousseff’s approval ratings in polls fell from around 50% during the 2014 elections, 40% 
around Christmas 2014, to 12-13% (Indicadores CNI, 2016; Datafolha, 2016) in March 2015, to 8-10% in 
July-August 2015 (Datafolha showing the lower figure, surveyed in early August 2015; Datafolha, 2016, p. 
14). 
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key actor, the PMDB Senator (and later minister) Romero Jucá, stated on the recordings 
that it was necessary to “stop the bleeding” of the political class by changing government 
and ending the Prosecutor General’s project of cleaning politics (Valente, 2016). With the 
leaks, it became apparent that the public signals about political crisis and the stated 
reasons for the impeachment, available to all Brazilians through the media, had an 
insidious subtext only known to elites, who aimed at ending the corruption probes by 
ousting the PT administration. Dilma Rousseff showed no sign of wanting to stop or curtail 
the probe while in office, not even as it targeted her party. From the leaked recordings of 
May 2016, we can conclude that the support for impeachment was not only a grab for 
power by the center-right parties of the governing coalition, but also an attempt at stopping 
the corruption probe from eventually reaching parties other than the PT.  
It is noticeable in the abstracted signal sequence above that every time the PT, 
Dilma Rousseff, or her predecessor Lula were targeted by the Petrobras investigations, the 
momentum of impeachment grew, even though the eventually effective ousting could not 
be based in the Petrobras case. The mainstream media only amplified the apparent 
message of political crisis and instability, prioritizing news from the front stage concerning 
the President, rather than the backstage reasoning of the political elite for removing her. 
The crisis of the political scene supplanted itself unto the financial markets of Brazil, 
providing yet more arguments underpinning the impeachment. This dynamic, where intra-
media information cascades pushed by intra-elite power games become a manifest force 
on stock markets, is discussed in the following section.   
 
Information and flows of the Brazilian financial markets 
 
The flows of information about a scandal’s political consequences, and the 
anticipation of those consequences, are shared between media and the political system, 
broadly speaking, but these flows are also reflected in the speculation and bubbles of stock 
markets. Market reactions to different social proofs were readily visible during the process 
of impeaching Rousseff. Events on the political scene deemed important in the media 
triggered immediate reactions from actors on the financial markets, visible in aggregated 
financial indicators such as stock markets and exchange rates. In this section, I will provide 
two examples of this behavior of the Brazilian markets. During the impeachment process, 
traders and shareholders reacted to the publicly available signals with a view to the 
perceived negative economic conditions during the deadlock of the Rousseff administration. 
When news indicated impeachment of Rousseff as likely, Brazilian stocks increased in 
value, and inversely decreased in periods without news on the impeachment, because the 
Rousseff administration was depicted as unable to implement economic reforms.   
The first example is the spike in Brazilian stock value the day after the 
impeachment petition was accepted (December 3, 2015). The São Paulo stock market 
Bovespa rapidly reacted to the news, breaking a steady decline of the preceding period, 
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rising 3.29% on average within the day, with Petrobras preferred stock rising 6.12% and 
the Banco do Brazil leading with an 8.4% rise. As the Supreme Court intervened in the 
impeachment process shortly thereafter, and it became clear that the initiation of 
proceedings would only take place after the Carnival, the stock markets again declined 
(and the dollar-real exchange rate climbed). Later news, in February and March, heralding 
the impeachment of Rousseff (e.g. the imprisonment of Rousseff’s marketing strategist 
João Santana on February 23, new plea bargains alleging corruption in Rousseff’s campaign 
on March 4, and Lula’s testimony the following day) likewise had the effect of breaking the 
trend in the declining stock market: 
 
Graphic 4 
Bovespa index, November 2015 till March 2016 
35000
37000
39000
41000
43000
45000
47000
49000
51000
53000
 
Source: BM&F-Bovespa (Cotações). 
 
Zooming in on the last days of Dilma Rousseff’s presidency, the graph below gives 
a second example of the Bovespa index from the day of the vote for impeachment in the 
Lower House of Congress to the day of the corresponding vote in the Senate. In response 
to the Lower House’s ratification, the Bovespa index rose again (with a 5-day interruption) 
until April 27, continuing the trend of March and April. On the 28th, the Central Bank chose 
to maintain the interest rate at 14.25% and the market cooled off for a fortnight, to rise 
sharply during the 2-day debate in the Senate preceding the removal of Rousseff on May 
12: 
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Graphic 5 
Bovespa index, April 18 till May 12 
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Source: BM&F-Bovespa (Cotações). 
 
Similarly, the exchange rate between the Brazilian real and the dollar mirrors the 
market activity and the possibility of impeachment: as the stock markets went down, the 
real steadily lost value vis-à-vis the dollar throughout the second half of 2015, and only 
recuperated this with, along with a string of negative news for Rousseff that started in 
February and exploded in March (UOL Economia, 2016).  
The cascade mechanism is still based on the social proof gathered from media: 
traders perceive investment instability caused by scandal; then, other traders and 
algorithms pick up on these market tendencies, media report on those movements, and 
the market goes down en bloc, along with the currency. Not surprisingly, the actors of the 
stock market react on possibilities—in this case, on the possibility of impeachment, trying 
to buy stocks cheap before other actors realize that their value may increase after the 
impeachment. This explains the rapid spikes, rather than prolonged value increases, of the 
market: Short bursts of speculative activity and no real changes in the economic realities 
of Brazil, because the Congress stalled economic reform during the whole period while 
waiting for the impeachment. The traders’ perception of scandal is of course modulated by 
media attention, and it is even amplified (through positive feedback) when journalists of 
financial beats publish news items connecting the market indicators to the political events 
of a scandal. 
Although theoretically, the sudden concerted moves of shareholders scattered 
across the world could be mere correlation, I will argue that the events that gradually 
brought about the ousting of Dilma Rousseff were in fact the cause for these fluctuations, 
because they were internationally visible and of obvious consequence to the economic 
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policies of Brazil. This could be interpreted as a second stage of the information cascade. 
The biased selection of news issues is not only closely correlated to the stock market and 
the exchange rate, but may actually have caused shorter bursts of financial activity in 
reaction to the impeachment news. The brokers, like the editors, were more agitated when 
the impeachment seemed more likely: the value of (scandal) information on the stock 
market, just like the media market, is anticipated, or potential, value.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has shown how Brazil’s dominant media outlets in the period preceding 
the ousting effectively eclipsed questions of accountability by over-exposing the 
impeachment and the Petrobras investigations against PT politicians. As information about 
these issues cascaded between the media actors and on to the stock markets, other 
political actors went under the radar of the media, as did the urgent democratic problem 
of handing the government over to other elite actors also investigated in the Lava Jato 
probe. By disregarding information on these actors to the grave extent documented in this 
article, the media outlets amplified the cascade initiated by that very same group within 
the political elite, and made politics a matter of impeaching the President rather than 
holding all of the political spectrum accountable.  
Thus, on April 17, 2016, 73% of the Chamber of Federal Representatives voted in 
favor of the petition for impeaching Dilma Rousseff. Of the 511 representatives voting, 
virtually none cited the explicit justification of the petition—the delays of transfers from 
the Treasury to the public banks. However, scores of representatives stated that by voting 
for the impeachment, they voted against corruption, implicitly or explicitly reproducing the 
narrative that first emerged from the 2014 disclosure of corruption in the state oil company 
Petrobras. This narrative of the President’s personal responsibility in either the corruption 
case or the delayed transfers was a recurring theme, although the allegations still lack 
substantial evidence. In fact, between the vote in the Chamber and the vote in the Senate, 
a technical report of the Senate’s lawyers demonstrated that no internal document 
corroborated the theory of Rousseff’s involvement nor any intentions in the Finance 
ministry or the National Treasury of masking budget deficits through the maneuver. 
Despite the report, on May 12, the Vice President Michel Temer took the mantle temporarily 
from Dilma Rousseff, ultimately riding the information cascade to the Presidency on August 
31 with the final ratification of the Senate.  
To sum up the present case study of the information cascade of the intertwined 
impeachment process and corruption scandals, the article has attempted to show that the 
concept of information cascades is fruitful for analyzing political scandals and that, 
moreover, the cascade phenomenon challenges preconceptions of the relations between 
media, political actors, accountability institutions, and publics. Accountability was 
hampered by the media, and the public opinion seemed not to matter much in this case, 
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because the cascading of information from a subgroup within the political elite through 
media and into the financial markets accumulated and made it alluringly easy to disregard 
other information. Public signals sent by political actors and reproduced by media and 
financial institutions might really be part of an entirely different set of signals only known 
(or acknowledged) internally in the political field. By stacking such signals, political issues 
may be confounded and conflated in such a way that the media’s anticipation and over-
valorization of political disruption obscures both possible consequences and intentions 
behind the process leading to such disruption. Similarly, the inflated value of information 
about the perceived center of power will depreciate the value of news on other powerful 
political actors, diminishing accountability and transparency for the electorate.   
What we see, then, is not the media informing Brazilian audiences about the 
combat on corruption, but rather a strong public with decision-making power (the Brazilian 
Congress) deliberating internally, through the media, about the solutions to the threatening 
corruption probes. Spinning off of the political reactions to the information sequences, the 
media attention was modulated by the perceived value of that information by media actors, 
and the information was then disseminated along cultural and political fault lines that 
shaped this information and excluded other relevant information in a systematic although 
not sufficiently acknowledged way. 
In the extant literature analyzing scandals and media exposés, media hypes and 
storms, researchers have pointed out how such media phenomena are potentially harmful, 
because a topic can be blown out of proportion, leading to suboptimal political and social 
solutions. With the notion of information cascades, that is, an aggregate phenomenon that 
emerges from the range of signals emitted by political, economic, and media actors and 
institutions, it becomes clear that stakes are even higher. Information cascades may have 
damaging consequences that can impinge upon the equilibrium and survival of a 
representative democracy. 
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Abstract 
 
Cascading corruption news: explaining the bias of media coverage to Brazil's political scandals 
 
Through a content analysis of 8,800 news items and six months of front pages of three Brazilian 
newspapers, all dealing with corruption and political transgression, the present article documents the 
remarkable bias of media coverage toward corruption scandals. Said bias is examined as an 
informational phenomenon, arising from key systemic and commercial factors of Brazil’s news media: 
an information cascade of news on corruption formed, destabilizing the governing coalition and 
legitimizing the impeachment process of Dilma Rousseff. As this process gained momentum, questions 
of accountability were disregarded by the media, with harmful effects for democracy.   
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Resumo 
 
Cascatas de notícias sobre corrupção: explicando viés midiático nos escândalos brasileiros 
 
Fazendo uma análise de conteúdo de seis meses de manchetes em três jornais brasileiros, além de 
8.800 notícias sobre corrupção e transgressão política, o artigo estuda o viés da atenção midiática 
para vários escândalos de corrupção em 2015-2016. Esse viés é examinado como um fenômeno de 
informação, decorrente de fatores sistêmicos e comerciais no sistema de mídia brasileira: uma cascata 
de informação sobre corrupção emergiu, desestabilizando a coalizão de governo e legitimando o 
processo de impeachment de Dilma Rousseff. Com o ímpeto crescente desse processo, questões de 
accountability foram desconsideradas pela mídia, com efeitos nocivos para a democracia. 
 
Palavras-chave: escândalos; corrupção; impeachment; cascatas de informações; notícias 
 
 
Resumen 
 
Noticias cascada de corrupción: explicando parcialidad en la prensa sobre los escándalos brasileños 
 
El artículo estudia la parcialidad de la atención de los medios de comunicación para varios escándalos 
brasileños de corrupción en 2015-16, en un análisis de contenido de seis meses de páginas delanteras 
en tres periódicos, además de 8.800 noticias sobre corrupción y transgresión política. Esta parcialidad 
es examinada como un fenómeno de información, derivado de factores sistémicos y comerciales en el 
sistema de medios brasileños: una cascada de información sobre corrupción emergió, desestabilizando 
la coalición de gobierno y legitimando el proceso de impugnación de la presidenta Dilma Rousseff. Con 
el ímpetu creciente de ese proceso, las cuestiones de accountability no fueron consideradas por los 
medios de comunicación, con efectos nocivos para la democracia. 
 
Palabras clave: escándalos; corrupción; impugnación; cascadas de información; noticias 
 
 
Résumé 
 
Cascades d’information sur la corruption: expliquer la partialité dans la presse lors des scandales du 
Brésil 
 
En appliquant le concept de “cascades d’information” pour étudier les scandales de corruption, 
l’opinion publique et les changements politiques, cet article analysera le phénomène de l’information 
précédant la destitution de la présidente brésilienne Dilma Rousseff. L’article étudiera comment 
l’information sur la corruption fut largement répandue et construite dans les sphères publiques du 
Brésil comme par exemple l’élite politique, la presse et les marchés financiers. Dans cette cascade, la 
valorisation de l’information sur l’affaire Petrobras a été décisive non seulement pour la destitution de 
la présidente, mais aussi pour la légitimité du processus de mise en accusation. Ce processus a connu 
un élan grandissant et les questions d´accountability ont été laissées de côté par les médias, ce qui a 
eu des effets nocifs pour la démocratie.   
 
Mots-clés: scandales; corruption; destitution; cascades d’information; nouvelles 
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